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Completing the first phase of the SEALORDS program, in January 1969 PBRs, assault support patrol boats (ASPB), and other river craft established patrol sectors along canals westward from the Vam Co Tay to the Mekong River in Operation Barrier Reef. The Giant Slingshot operation, so named for the configuration of the two rivers, severely hampered Communist resupply in the region near the capital and in the Plain of Reeds. naval forces pushed up the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers west of Saigon, against heavy enemy opposition, to cut infiltration routes from the "Parrot's Beak" area of Cambodia. As a symbol of the Vietnamese contribution to the combined effort, the allied command changed the name of this operation from Foul Deck to Tran Hung Dao I. Later in the month, Swift boats, PBRs, riverine assault craft, and Vietnamese naval vessels penetrated the Giang Thanh-Vinh Te canal system and established patrols along the waterway from Ha Tien on the gulf to Chau Doc on the upper Bassac. South Vietnamese paramilitary ground troops helped naval patrol units secure the transportation routes in this operational area, soon named Search Turn. In early November 1968, PBRs and riverine assault craft opened two canals between the Gulf of Siam at Rach Gia and the Bassac River at Long Xuyen. In the first phase of the SEALORDS campaign allied forces established patrol "barriers," often using electronic sensor devices, along the waterways paralleling the Cambodian border. These intrusions into former Viet Cong bastions were possible only with the on-call support of naval aircraft and the heavily armed riverine assault craft. This freed the PBRs for operations along the previously uncontested smaller rivers and canals. Task Force 115 PCFs mounted lightning raids into enemy- held coastal waterways and took over patrol responsibility for the delta's larger rivers.
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Although continuing to function, the Game Warden, Market Time, and Riverine Assault Force operations were scaled down and their personnel and material resources increasingly devoted to SEALORDS. To focus the allied effort on the SEALORDS campaign, COMNAVFORV appointed his deputy the operational commander, or "First SEALORD," of the newly activated Task Force 194. In addition, five SEAL platoons supported operations in the delta.Ĭomplementing the American naval contingent were the Vietnamese Navy's 655 ships, assault craft, patrol boats, and other vessels. The lethal Bronco flown by the "Black Ponies" of VAL-4 carried 8 to 16 5- inch Zuni rockets, 19 2.75-inch rockets, 4 M-60 machine guns, and a 20-millimeter cannon. This air component was soon augmented by the 15 fixed-wing OV-10 Bronco aircraft of Attack Squadron Light (VAL) 4, activated in April 1969. The River Patrol Force deployed 258 patrol and minesweeping boats the 3,700-man Riverine Assault Force counted 184 monitors, transports, and other armored craft and Helicopter Attack Squadron Light (HAL) 3 flew 25 armed helicopters. Navy's Coastal Surveillance Force operated 81 Swift boats, 24 Coast Guard WPBs, and 39 other vessels. When Admiral Zumwalt launched SEALORDS in October 1968 with the blessing of the new COMUSMACV, General Creighton Abrams, allied naval forces in South Vietnam were at peak strength. Zumwalt, Jr., appointed COMNAVFORV in September 1968. Navy, South Vietnamese Navy, and allied ground forces to cut enemy supply lines from Cambodia and disrupt operations at his base areas deep in the delta. The SEALORDS (Southeast Asia Lake, Ocean, River, and Delta Strategy) program was a determined effort by U.S. The Navy in particular spearheaded a drive in the Mekong Delta to isolate and destroy the weakened Communist forces. In fact, from 1968 to 1971, the allies exploited the Communists' staggering battlefield losses during the Tet attacks by pushing the enemy's large main force units out to the border areas, extending the government's presence into Viet Cong strongholds, and consolidating control over population centers. forces prepared the South Vietnamese military to assume complete responsibility for the war, they also worked to keep pressure on the enemy. This "Vietnamization" of the war became the cornerstone of American policy.Īs U.S. leaders decided that their ability to deal from a position of strength depended on an enlargement and improvement of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces as U.S. At the same time, the administration began diplomatic talks in Paris with the Vietnamese Communist in hopes of achieving a negotiated settlement of the long conflict. The Johnson administration, convinced that the allied military struggle was faring badly and buffeted by growing domestic opposition to the American role in the war, ordered the gradual withdrawal of U.S. The enemy's bloody country-wide Tet Offensive of February and March and the follow-up attacks during the spring influenced American decision-making in several important ways. Dramatic changes in the course of the war characterized 1968.